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Salafi Activism and the Promotion of a Modern Muslim Identity: Evolving mediums of 
Da’wa amongst Yogyakartan University Students 
Chris Chaplin, Fellow, Department of Methodology, London School of Economics and 
Political Science, c.chaplin@lse.ac.uk1  
 
Indonesia has witnessed the emergence of a market of Islamic goods, services and media 
platforms that have catalysed a qualitative shift in the ways individuals come to express their 
religious convictions. Salafi Islam is no exception to this transformation, and this paper 
provides a case study of contemporary Salafi propagation amongst Yogyakarta’s students 
and graduates. Through description and analysis of campus based religious lectures, 
websites, magazines and fashion outlets linked to the al-Atsary Islamic Education 
Foundation, this paper explores the intricacies of campus affiliated da’wa. Linked to a 
‘literalist’ interpretation of Islam reliant on scholars in Saudi Arabia, Salafism is frequently 
denounced as foreign to Indonesian norms. Yet, while activists do indeed promote a rigid 
adherence to Islamic tenets, they also align Islamic values to concerns with a modern Muslim 
identity. By framing Salafism as sensitive to ideas of professional employment, while 
juxtaposing it against images of a less-well educated rural Islam, they have thus have created 
a unique strand of urban Salafi propagation.  
 
Key Words: Islamic Activism, Salafism, Religious Consumption, Islamic Modernity, 
Yogyakarta, Indonesia 
 
Introduction 
Salafi inspired Islamic activism has expanded rapidly since its introduction into Indonesia 
during the mid-1980s. Although relatively small in numbers, Salafis have created a vast 
network of schools, foundations, publishing houses, internet sites and radio channels whose 
expanse covers all corners of the archipelago. Frequently recognised by their strict adherence 
to conservative Islamic dress (as men wear long religious robes and women wear the niqab), 
they aim to literally emulate the al-Salaf al-Salih (which they regard as the first three 
generations of Muslims) in order to return to a true and original understanding of Islam. Their 
hostility to local religious and cultural practices, together with their preference to refer to 
scholars based in the Arabian Peninsula, distinguishes them from the majority of Indonesian 
Muslims – and debates as to whether they represent the ‘Arabisation’ of Indonesian Islam are 
common (Bruinessen, 2009; Hasan, 2008; Scott, 2016). Yet, despite the global dynamics that 
underline Salafism, Indonesian strands have thrived within post-authoritarian Indonesia since 
1998, and have become adept at promoting their religious ideals through social media, public 
lectures, political alliances and the sale of commodities.  
                                                      
1 This research was conducted with the assistance of a grant provided by the Evans Fund, Department 
of Social Anthropology, University of Cambridge 
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Within this paper, Salafi activism is approached as part of multi-stranded and multi-
directional social movement, building upon an increasing array of literature that views both 
Salafism, and religious revivalist movements more broadly, as sustained efforts to challenge 
pre-established forms of Islamic authority and practice.2 Indonesian Salafism is a diverse and 
fragmented movement, sustained not through any singular organizational structure, but 
shaped and transformed through the lived experiences, disagreements, and multiple ways in 
which it is promoted by individuals within a given locality; by which I refer to the spaces that 
define the everyday world of individuals not merely spatially but through a set of social 
interactions that can create both coherence and difference (Massey, 1994: 139). This diversity 
is reflected in the growing amount of insightful literature covering Indonesian strands of 
Salafism. For instance, scholars have investigated the movement’s history (Hassim, 2010), 
socio-political mobilisation (Hasan, 2006; Jurdi, 2012), formal educational networks (Wahid, 
2014), proselytising radio stations (Sunarwoto, 2016), outreach programs amongst women 
(Nisa, 2012, 2013), and the dynamics of village based propagation (Krismono, 2015). As 
these works illustrate, not only is the movement involved in a diverse range of propagational 
and socio-political activities, but it has flourished within Indonesia’s democratic environment 
across the archipelagic nation.   
There remains an analytical gap however. While much has been said concerning how the 
movement mobilises resources and builds upon political opportunities (for example, Hasan, 
2006), there is less emphasis on how activists themselves come to adapt and synthesise their 
faith with local and national understandings of identity, faith and modernity. This paper aims 
to fill this space by strengthening our understanding as to how Salafi enthusiasts adapt and 
frame the existential coordinates of their religious identity in relation to the socio-political 
forces at play within their given locality. By examining how Salafi scholars linked to the 
universities of Yogyakarta promote a religious ethic, this paper thus argues that they have 
become proficient at combining calls to the faith with references to economic progress, 
national development and modernity. In doing so they not only alter the dynamics of religious 
activism but also initiate a fundamental shift in how Salafism is represented and enacted 
within everyday circumstance within the university campus.    
Based on ethnographic research conducted from 2011 to 2012, this paper investigates campus 
based da’wa (propagation) in order to understand the inner logic within the Salafism appeal to 
urban and campus based Islamic enthusiasts. The primary focus concerns the religious 
lectures organised by the student orientated Yayasan Pendidikan Islam al-Atsary (al Atsary 
Islamic Education Foundation, YPIA) as well as the activism of YPIA members who promote 
                                                      
2 Concerning Salafism specifically see: Bonnefoy, 2011; Hasan, 2006; Pall, 2013. Concerning religious 
revivalism more broadly see: Bayat, 2005; Lehmann & Siebzehner, 2006; Wiktorowicz, 2007.  
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their religious ideas through independent ventures. These include the social media company 
Yufid, the Shari’a inspired business magazine Pengusaha Muslim (Muslim Businessman), 
and those involved in the creation and sale of new religious commodities such as t-shirts. This 
activism underlines a particular skill amongst Salafi activists to understand their environment 
and utilise their professional skills to further promote their religion. Furthermore, it denotes a 
flexibility within the concept of da’wa itself, and the sensitivity of Salafi followers to the 
social, economic and ideological forces that influence the lives of students. Far from being 
decoupled from the everyday environment of the university campuses, da’wa activists utilise 
references to the supposed intellectualism and progressiveness of their student audience. 
Although this perhaps renders the idea of Salafism being a global and ‘timeless’ interpretation 
of Islam problematic, it emphasises how Salafism has become entangled in broader trends of 
Islamic revival within Indonesia, coming to promote a modern Muslim identity that is 
complementary to the professional aspirations of the student body.  
 
Understanding Salafi Activism within Indonesia 
Prior to elaborating upon the dynamics of contemporary religious da’wa amongst 
Yogyakartan students, it is important to describe what I mean when evoking the term ‘Salafi.’ 
What is referred to here as Salafism has spread across the archipelago since the 1980s, 
forming a framework of educational establishments (Hasan, 2010b; Wahid, 2014), as well as 
playing a crucial role in post-Suharto sectarian violence via the Laskar Jihad (Hasan, 2006). 
However, providing a definitive account of the movement is no easy task; at present, there are 
at least five different networks in Indonesia, who frequently denounce each other by drawing 
from the same religious resources.3 Moreover, despite growing literature pertaining to the 
Salafi movement both globally (Koning, 2007; Meijer, 2009) and within Indonesia 
specifically (Hasan, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2010a, 2010b; ICG, 2004; Nisa, 2012, 2013; 
Sunarwoto, 2016; Wahid, 2014), the use of the term remains somewhat obscure. Not only 
does Salafi denote an important reference to Islamic history, deriving from al-Salaf or ‘those 
                                                      
3 A preliminary list of these poles within the movement includes: those who follow scholars such as 
Abu Nida, Yazid bin Abdul Qadir Jawas, Faiz Asifuddin and Aunur Rafiq Ghufron, who are the main 
focus of this article; former followers of Jafar Umar Thalib linked to Luqman Ba’abduh, Muhammad 
as-Sewed and Ayip Syafruddin; former followers of Jafar Umar Thalib linked to Dzulqarmain, who 
was in charge of fatwa for Laskar Jihad; former followers of Jafar Umar Thalib linked to Abu Thurob 
al-Jawi; those affiliated with the Makassar based religious organisation Wahdah Islamiyah. While not 
the focus of this article, it is interesting to note that fragmentation has been most common amongst 
those formerly linked to Laskar Jihad, as these groups more commonly engage in activities that 
discredit the legitimacy of other Salafis (Sunarwoto, 2016). 
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who came before us’,4 but traced genealogically references to the ‘Salafi’ saturate the work of 
some of the earliest Muslim scholars, most notably al-Bukhari (810-870), Muslim (817-875) 
and Al-Awza’i (707-774) (Hassim, 2010). Accordingly, the al-Salaf al-Salih (pious 
ancestors) command respect and inspiration amongst Muslims.  
Within this paper the term will be limited to a loose but specific reformist movement that 
aims to closely emulate the first three generations of Muslims, the Sahaba, Tabi’un and Tabi’ 
al-Tabi’in, through scrupulous examination of their acts, deeds and sayings. Following rich 
works concerning the global development of a Salafi movement compiled in an edited 
volume by Meijer, I thus refer to a doctrine that developed within the Arabian Peninsula, 
most predominantly within Saudi Arabia during the 20th century (Meijer, 2009). It combines 
the reformist trends unleashed by Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703-92) and 
Muhammad al-Shawkani (d 1834) (Griffel, 2015), emphasising the need to literally adhere to 
the Qur’an and Sunna (deeds, teachings and sayings of the Prophet) through the emulation 
and study of Hadith (sayings and doings of the Prophet and his companions). Followers 
believe Muslim civilisation to have become tainted by bid’a (unIslamic innovations) and 
shirk (idol worship) and so stress a need to return to the true teachings of Islam by 
emphasising the importance of tawhid (oneness of God, or the doctrine of absolute 
monotheism). There is, moreover, a strong emphasis on da’wa and tarbiya (religious 
education) as followers aim to bring non-Salafis into the fold through grassroots activism. 
Indeed, the need to both educate oneself as well as others in correct Islam is considered Fard 
al-‘ayn (an individual obligation). 
The central position held by Saudi Arabia within the movement has often led opponents to 
clump it together with Wahhabism, although this undermines the contention that has 
frequently existed between the aimat al-Da’wa al-najdiyya (religious notables of the Najd) 
and the proponents of Salafism (for example, see Lacroix, 2011). Saudi Arabia - and the 
Arabian Peninsula including Yemen, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates more broadly - do 
provide an important financial, educational and religious reference point, but Salafism 
remains incredibly varied as there is no one global ‘centre’ or any pre-conceived 
mobilisational blueprint or hierarchical structure to follow. Nonetheless, Salafism made its 
first inroads within Indonesia in the 1980s through an influx of funding and educational 
opportunities from Saudi Arabia and the Arabian Peninsula more generally.  
                                                      
4 As Ibn Manzur recorded, it is linked to ‘the preceding group of people; those who have preceded you, 
from your forefathers and closest relatives, who are more advanced than you in age and virtue’ (as 
quoted in Hassim, 2010: 9) 
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It was the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council, 
DDII), formed in 1967 by former Prime Minister Mohammad Natsir (1908-1993), that 
became the main medium for donations from Middle Eastern countries.5 While not explicitly 
Salafi, DDII was fundamental in facilitating the spread of globally inspired Islamic 
scholarship within Indonesia. When Saudi Arabia wished to open a branch of the Imam 
Muhammad ibn Saud University of Riyadh in Jakarta, the DDII proved a useful national 
partner. The Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab (Institute for the Study of Islam and 
Arabic, LIPIA) was established in 1980 and, in its formative years, worked almost 
exclusively with DDII to provide language training to Islamic activists who wished to study 
in Saudi Arabia (Hasan, 2007). As LIPIA’s alumni network expanded it became a vital 
conduit through which Salafi literature was translated and disseminated.6  
The growth of the Salafi movement in Indonesia has gained increasing scholastic and media 
coverage, especially from the post-Suharto era onwards (Hasan, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2010b; 
Hassim, 2010; ICG, 2004; Jurdi, 2007, 2012; Nisa, 2012, 2013; Wahid, 2014). These studies 
have provided valuable insight upon which we can further our understanding of Salafism. 
Eeqbal Hassim has, for example, provided a perceptive study discussing the foundational 
moments of the movement within the LIPIA and DDII, and how it differs – both theologically 
and socially – from Indonesia’s larger Islamic organisations such as Muhammadiyah 
(Hassim, 2010). A more contemporary study of the movement has been undertaken by Din 
Wahid, whose extensive research provides insight into the evolution of Salafi pesantren 
(religious schools) in Indonesia, how they obtain funds, what materials they teach to their 
students and how they disseminate the Salafi manhaj (method) (Wahid, 2014). Eva Nisa has 
additionally advanced understanding of Salafism by focusing on recruitment and the ethical 
dilemma’s faced by women Salafi reverts in Yogyakarta (Nisa, 2012). Meanwhile 
Syarifuddin Jurdi has also provided a thorough account of the Salafi inspired Islamic 
organisation, Wahdah Islamiyah, an organisation with over 120 branches across the nation 
(Jurdi, 2012).  
The most thorough account concerning the development of Salafism in Indonesia has been 
provided by Noorhaidi Hasan, who argued that the arrival of Salafism cannot be decoupled 
from the wider socio-political transformations that affected Indonesians during the latter 20th 
                                                      
5 Banned from direct political participation by Suharto’s New Order, Natsir saw the DDII as a move 
away from ‘top- down’ Islamic politics to ‘bottom-up’ social activities that would renew Islamic piety 
amongst the Indonesian citizenry.  
6 It should be noted, however, that not all LIPIA graduates were advocates of Salafi doctrine. By the 
1990s teaching staff supportive of the Muslim Brotherhood inspired Sahwi (awakening) movement had 
taken up positions at LIPIA. Much like religious institutions in the Saudi kingdom itself, LIPIA’s staff 
thus competed against each other for influence and, as Sahwi-inspired ideas gained ground, many 
Salafi scholars began to advise their students against further study at LIPIA. 
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century (Hasan, 2006). Tracing its emergence during the mid 1980s to the rise and eventual 
demise of the militant Laskar Jihad in 2002, Hasan argues that the Salafi doctrine made its 
initial inroads through home-grown scholars such as Abu Nida, Yusuf Baisa, Ahmas Faiz 
Asifuddin and Aunur Rafiq Ghufron (Hasan, 2006). As Hasan continues, these scholars 
received DDII sponsored religious training both in Saudi Arabia and in LIPIA, and upon 
completing their studies, tapped into a network of university campuses and DDII affiliated 
schools in urban centres such as Yogyakarta, Makassar, Solo, Semarang and Jakarta, in order 
to find employment (Hasan, 2006). Building upon social movement theories, Hasan thus 
underlines how the movement mobilised resources and utilised political opportunities so as to 
gain prominence within Indonesia.  
As informative as Hasan and other scholastic works cited above are, little has been said 
concerning how Salafi agents themselves come to adapt and synthesise their faith with local 
and national understandings of identity, faith and modernity. It is on this issue that this paper 
aims to build upon and contribute to our understanding of Salafism. In order to do so this 
paper will limit its scope to Yogyakarta and its surroundings. Yogyakarta is an important hub 
for the Salafi movement, where it was first introduced when Abu Nida (full name Chamsaha 
Sofwan) began teaching in the city. Born in 1954 in Gresik, East Java, Abu Nida had 
participated in a DDII sponsored transmigrasi da’i (transmigration preacher) program, which 
trained and then sent Islamic enthusiasts to remote parts of the country, prior to receiving a 
scholarship to study at the Imam Muhammad ibn Saudi University in Riyadh. After 
completing his studies in 1985, Abu Nida joined the Afghan war against the Soviets under the 
leadership of Jamil al-Rahman. After three months, he returned to Indonesia and in 1986 he 
moved to Yogyakarta, where the local head of DDII provided him with a teaching position 
and access to mosques within the vicinity of the Universitas Gadjah Madah (UGM). Abu 
Nida became a popular feature for many students and so he quickly expanded his lectures to 
other campuses as well as setting up an informal ‘school’ within the proximity of UGM for 
enthusiastic followers.  
As those following him grew, Abu Nida expanded his operations, establishing the Yayasan 
Majelis at-Turots al-Islamy (at-Turots al-Islamy Foundation, or at-Turots) in 1994, and 
opening a number of religious schools, mosques, and an informal Salafi ‘village’ during that 
decade. He was joined by numerous other Salafi preachers who began to participate in 
religious education across the city. These included Umar Budiharjo, who founded the 
Pesantren As-Syifa (later renamed the Pesantren Taruna al Quran) in 1993, and Abdul Afifi 
Wadud, who preached amongst high school and university students and opened the Islamic 
clothing store Ihya in 1994. However, arguably the most notorious of these preachers was 
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Jafar Umar Thalib, who was initially invited to the city by Abu Nida, but became hostile to 
the latter’s perceived willingness to work with non-Salafi organisations (such as the DDII). 
Jafar Umar Thalib would go on to form the 7,000 strong Laskar Jihad (Jihad Brigade) that 
would participate in sectarian conflict in Maluku during the early 2000s. During the 1990s he 
became one of Abu Nida’s fiercest critics and  followers of these two preachers were vocal 
opponents of each other, with their condemnation of the other often leading to confrontations 
outside mosques. The divide between the two remains to this day, but hostility – either verbal 
or through direct conformation – is rare.    
The history of Jafar Umar Thalib has been well documented by Hasan and security experts 
(Hasan, 2006; ICG, 2004). In contrast, the networks of Abu Nida, and how they have evolved 
since the resignation of Suharto in 1998, have received relatively less attention, and it is to 
these that this paper turns. Indeed, the university campus provided Abu Nida with the 
necessary space and locality in which to recruit young followers, but in doing so his 
propagational activism intersected with a broader interest in Islam amongst university 
students and younger upwardly mobile Muslims. These individuals had benefited from the 
economic and educational opportunities made available by the New Order, but rejected the 
political ideology and authoritarian practices of the regime (Effendy, 2003; Hefner, 2000; 
Latif, 2005). These university educated Muslims had begun to re-engage with Islamic values 
to navigate the challenges of society, leading to the increased popularity of both nationally 
orientated Islamic intellectualism commonly referred to as ‘Civil Islam’ (Hefner, 2000), as 
well as global Islamic scholarship such as Salafism. It is the intersectionality of the Salafi 
ethic with the broader emphasis on university education and creation of a modern society, 
which this study explicitly analyses, and to which it aims to build on the abovementioned 
literature concerning Salafism in Indonesia. Indeed, there remains a need to examine how 
Salafi activists come to adapt and synthesise their faith with local and national understandings 
of identity, faith and modernity. 
 
Campus Lectures and the Yayasan Pendidikan Islam al-Atsary 
The resignation of Suharto in 1998 and subsequent political reformasi allowed Abu Nida’s at-
Turots foundation to expand its activism apace. In 2000 they opened their flagship 
educational establishment, the Islamic Centre Bin Baz, which was later complemented by a 
nearby medical school, as well as a hospital.7 By 2012 they had also trained over 1,400 
preachers who have been sent across Java and Indonesia to spread the Salafi message. 
Furthermore, at-Turots affiliated preachers were pivotal in organising several student 
                                                      
7 The Islamic Centre Bin Baz was named after the former Saudi grand mufti, Shaykh ‘Abd al-Aziz Bin 
Baz (1910-1999), who proved to be a patron for global Salafi initiatives as well as a prominent scholar 
whose works are frequently quoted within Salafi circles. 
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orientated lectures, foundations and religious programs, which would later take on an 
independence of their own. Of particular concern here is the Yayasan Pendidikan Islam al-
Atsary (al-Atsary Islamic Education Foundation, YPIA). The YPIA’s roots lie in informal 
religious lectures that were organised on the UGM campus in 2000 by Ustadz (preacher) Afifi 
Abdul Wadud, Kholid Syamhudi, Abu Sa’ad Muhammad Nur Huda and Fauzan bin Abdillah; 
the latter three all teach in at-Turots affiliated institutions. This initial activism occurred at a 
time when political Islam was in the public spotlight given the rise of Kesatuan Aksi 
Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (Indonesian Unified Muslim Student Action, KAMMI), waves 
of religious violence in Maluku, Poso and Kalimantan as well as the global debate catalysed 
by the events of September 11th 2001. Accordingly, original YPIA members stated these 
lectures became a popular alternative to Islamic lectures that were overtly political, as they 
attempted to appeal to a ‘pure’ and depoliticised Islam outside of the destabilising national 
climate (Interview, Yogyakarta, 28 March 2012).  
The success of these lectures led to the establishment of an informal student association in 
2002 which would later register as the YPIA in 2007. Its explicit mission is to disseminate 
Salafi knowledge within the university campuses of Yogyakarta. In order to achieve this, the 
YPIA has launched a number of structured courses on Islamic learning and Arabic language 
classes, which follow a syllabus that includes key Salafi authors such as Muhammad Nasir al-
Din al-Albani and Muhammad al-Uthaymin (LBIA, 2006). They also manage several student 
boarding houses for both men and women, all located close to UGM’s main campus. Students 
residing in these houses are required to take religious classes, assist in cleaning nearby 
mosques as well as distributing the Friday Islamic bulletin At-Tauhid after Friday prayers. 
However, the most prominent activity organised by the YPIA remains the public religious 
lecture. The foundation currently organises over 28 such lectures a week on four separate 
university campuses.8 These cover a number of topics including Hadith studies, tawhid, aqida 
(creed), adab (courteousness or culture), akhlak (morality) and fiqh (jurisprudence) and are 
open to both men and women (although these audiences are strictly segregated) who can have 
either an advanced or simple understanding of the Islamic sciences. Students are encouraged 
to attend as many open lectures as possible, which – aside from increasing one’s knowledge – 
are meant to inspire one’s desire for personal muhasabah (introspection).  
Muhasabah is an integral part of becoming mukmin (pious) and meant to provide an initial 
path through which one comes to understand the importance of religious living. As one 
informant, Yudi (pseudonym), who went on to create his own religious social media services, 
stated:  
                                                      
8 Aside from UGM, these take place on Ahmad Dahlan University, Yogyakarta State University and 
Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic University. 
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‘I came (to know about Salafism) from friends at UGM (Universitas Gadjah Madah). So my 
friends often organised routine lectures on campus and afterwards I saw that there was one 
at my faculty and that’s it! I tried and easily joined. Afterwards I was interested’ (Interview, 
Yogyakarta, 4 June 2012). 
Further qualifying exactly why such lectures were important and appealed to him Yudi 
continued:  
‘The first time I came across the Salafi lectures I was hooked because…I liked finding logic 
(in things) and it entered logic…no figure was considered the ideologue…when I first arrived 
in Yogya (Yogyakarta) in the year 98-99 I also joined left-wing discussions (diskusi kiri). We 
talked about Das Kapital, Karl Marx and others. Now this also has logic. But, afterward I 
met the organiser (pembesar) of the Salafi kajian and became sure in my heart, and 
afterward, that’s it! Until this moment I have followed it like that’ (Interview, Yogyakarta, 4 
June 2012). 
Yudi was not the only one who mentioned the importance of lectures, as several other 
informants I spoke to also referred to its importance in their reversion. Indeed, for informants, 
an important aspect of the appeal of lectures relates to its ‘everyday’ relevance, which 
foregrounds a preference to understand religion in relation to one’s life through muhasabah 
over more scriptural forms of Islamic learning. Furthermore, these lectures, while often 
introductory, provided a first step to more intensive learning through structured classes, acting 
as ‘obligatory points of passage’ through which one familiarises oneself with the movement, 
its doctrine and activists.9 More experienced students and preachers would act as guides for 
newcomers, assisting them in personal matters as well as providing information on further 
learning.10  
I observed one YPIA weekly lecture at a Musholla (prayer hall) close to UGM’s Medical 
Studies faculty. The Musholla is a moderately sized two-storey building, with the ground 
floor reserved for men and the upstairs for women. These classes were led by Ustadz 
Solahudin (pseudonym), a teacher at the at-Turot’s ICBB. A polite and amiable individual, 
Solahudin is a former UGM student himself and had received a BA from UGM’s pharmacy 
                                                      
9 This phrase ‘obligatory points of passage’ derives from the work of Michel Callon who uses it in 
relation to actor network theory to stress a point through which actors are forced to converge on a 
certain topic and/or purpose. My use of the phrase loosely converges with this idea of passage although 
I envisage it as a physical space where actors engage with each other rather than a potential group of 
actors or problems one must pass through in a given network. For further information see, Callon, 
1986) 
10 Crucially, such observations are hardly unique to Salafism, as comradery has become a key 
characteristic of contemporary Islamic revivalism more broadly. For further examples of the role of 
halaqah or study circles see: Bruinessen, 2002; Mahmood, 2005.  
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department before studying at the Daar al-Hadits Institute in Yemen (a popular centre for 
Salafi study) for 4 years. His lectures did not attract a particularly big audience, and so he 
addressed approximately 12 males and an unknown number of females per week (I could not 
ascertain this information given strict gender segregation). These participants were students 
from the medical department, predominantly in their early twenties and who were new to 
Islamic classes.   
Solahudin would sit cross-legged in front of a microphone and knee-high table with the 
audience sitting around him in a semi-circle with their Qur’an, notebooks and textbooks in 
hand. They would follow a prepared syllabus titled Nutrisi Hati (Nutrition for the Heart), 
which was, in terms of religious sciences and content, simple. The premise was to inculcate a 
basic understanding and enthusiasm for Islam that would provide the first initial steps into a 
wider web of Salafi piety. There was an urge to engage in personal muhasabah in order to 
instil the true values of aqida, tawhid and thus follow ‘true’ Islam by becoming taqwa (fear 
and love of God). Yet, such religious tenets were frequently combined with an emotive appeal 
that greater piety would not only save oneself from judgement day, but also pave the way to 
overcoming the social ills and moral corruptions he believed plagued Indonesian society.  
For instance, in March 2012, when the wider student community was involved in 
demonstrations against a planned government fuel hike, Solahudin argued that such worldly 
concerns only help cause friction amongst the umma as well as detract from one’s 
concentration on religious obligations (Observation, Yogyakarta, 27 March 2012). Similarly, 
several weeks later, he joked about the public frenzy surrounding several deaths linked to the 
tomcat (rove beetle), believing that while such deaths were unfortunate, one should prepare 
for them by turning to religion rather than ‘gossiping’ and making demands upon the 
government (Observation, Yogyakarta, 10 April 2012). Importantly, he did not condemn the 
activities of students outright, but referred to the university as a place of contradictory forces. 
On the one hand, it was un-Islamic as it encouraged the mixing of the sexes, and so distracted 
men from both their studies and religious duty. Yet, on the other hand, it was a space and 
opportunity within which people could engage freely with religion and receive an education; 
an important requirement if one wanted to better the place of Muslims in society 
(Observation, Yogyakarta, 30 May 2012).  
As the lecture series progressed, it became clear the ‘secular’ university campus and Islam 
were reconciled by a need to build a modern and forward looking society based on ‘timeless’ 
Islamic values. Solahudin began to refer to the audience as a community of scholars who 
needed to assist each other in guarding against desire and adhering to religious principles. 
They were, in his words, a Majlis (council) who were evidently on their path of religious 
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piety – but who should also come together to improve society through their own education as 
well as more practical ability to provide assistance to less-well off individuals. It was notable 
that over time the number of male members decreased slightly but that those that remained 
became more confident in asking questions publically to Solahudin. They also began to pray 
together in a style specific to Salafi doctrine, adopt religious dress and grow their facial hair.11 
Several began expressing an interest in continuing to learn about Islam, and so were advised 
where else to find lectures or information by a YPIA affiliated third-year medical student, 
who was there to act as a guide for potential new members (Interview, Yogyakarta, 19 April 
2012). They were thus beginning to forge relations to the movement that could shift the ways 
they approached society and religious practice, and the lecture provided an important space in 
which this shift occurred and was given substance. The focal point of these lectures was the 
necessity to inculcate religious principles but this was always linked to inherently modern 
choices and lifestyles rather than being solely scholastic. The emphasis was on discovering 
how and why to ‘live’ Islam in line with the potential anxieties of ‘being a modern forward 
looking Muslim’ in Indonesia.  
Da’wa, Social Media and Ideas of Business 
Salafi campus lectures are complemented by an ever-expanding range of da’wa activities that 
rely on the skills, manpower and ideas of students and ex-students. If Islamic learning is one 
pivotal pillar to becoming a pious Salafi, being able to conduct da’wa in one’s community is 
another. Yet, as Eickelman and Piscatori remind us, da’wa is not a neutral or solely objective 
activity, but bound to a particular time and place (Eickelman & Piscatori, 1996). YPIA 
members are required to participate in the foundation’s outreach programs, although they 
have also used their own initiative to create websites and Islamic commodities through which 
they aim to promote Salafi principles. Accordingly, da’wa amongst those affiliated with the 
urban Salafi movement has come to comprise religious commodities, including magazines, 
social media and clothing outlets (to name but a few) that are informed by broader notions of 
popular culture within university campuses.  
It is not only the format of da’wa that has changed however, but also the content. There is 
increasingly a concern for what informants describe as ‘thematic issues’ (isu thematik, or 
kajian thematik) relating to particularly topical events or themes popularised in the media or 
society. This is evident in the outreach work of the YPIA, which distributes the weekly 
bulletin, At-Tauhid, outside mosques throughout the city every Friday. At-Tauhid consists of 
4-6 pages printed on cheap A5 paper, and provides a space for students to write about issues 
they believe to be of concern. For example, At-Tauhid No.7.8, distributed on 10 February 
                                                      
11 This style of prayer sees one touching feet with one’s peers and follows the method outlined by Al- 
Albani. For further information see Al-Albani, 2000. 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2012, fretted over the evils of celebrating Valentine’s Day - an issue that has become an 
obsession for many conservative Muslims in Indonesia.12 In this edition, Arif Rohman Habib, 
an aspiring scholar and member of the YPIA, used the controversy surrounding Valentine’s 
Day to reflect on its un-Islamic nature and the ‘Western’ influences that were corrupting 
Indonesian youth (Habib, 2012). Indeed, it underlines how the substance of da’wa relates to 
society and is embedded in public debates occurring at the time.    
The space At-Tauhid provides students is gradually being eclipsed by social media and 
internet platforms however. The YPIA manages the websites www.muslim.or.id and 
www.muslimah.or.id to provide information of religious events and sermons for a young and 
technology savvy audience, and it is here that many aspiring scholars now come to post their 
articles. Arguably the largest online Salafi enterprise in Indonesia is the Yufid group. Yufid 
was formed in 2009 by several IT graduates who had met via YPIA lectures, and who wished 
to continue to promote their religion in a way that aligned to their professional skills. They 
received start-up capital from a religious philanthropist familiar with the YPIA and created a 
search engine to provide followers of Salafism with a platform from which to access 
‘authenticated’ Islamic online sources.13 Yufid has since extended its online services to 
include a further 14 websites14 and 15 mobile phone or Ipad applications that can be 
downloaded from iTunes or Google Play.15  
Yufid’s portfolio of websites includes the eloquently designed yufidia.com, an online Islamic 
‘encyclopaedia’ as well as the yufidedu.com educational website, which provides lecture 
videos by staff concerning topics of Arabic, mathematics and physics. They have also 
recently launched the online religious TV broadcasting station Yufid.tv, which airs videos on 
topics such as how to pray, lectures for children, Arabic lessons and Islamic documentaries. 
Its repertoire relates to numerous themes of socio-political concern, such as the plight of 
Muslims in Indonesia in light of natural disasters, the perceived lack of real piety within 
Indonesia, as well as global events like the Syrian civil war. Not shying away from slang or 
the use of professional editing (which includes background music, fading and cutting to 
                                                      
12 Valentine’s Day has frequently been an issue around which religious conservatives hold annual 
demonstrations, berating it as Christian, Jewish, Secular or even just a ‘sex holiday.’ For example, see: 
Gade, 2013; JakartaPost, 2014; Telegraph, 2013.  
13 To do so it utilised a Google Custom Search Platform to comb across multiple sites that are part of an 
ever-increasing database of virtual sources whose ‘Salafi-ness’ can be confirmed by Yufid’s network 
of employees and associated preachers. 
14 These include www.aqidatuna.com; www.carasholat.com; www.konsultasisyariah.com; 
www.kajian.net; www.khotbahjumat.com; www.kisahmuslim.com; www.nasehat.net; 
www.pengusahamuslim.com; www.sahabatnabi.com; www.yufid.tv; www.yufid.org; 
www.yufidedu.com; www.syaria.com; & www.whatisquran.com List sourced from, Yufid.inc, 2014. 
15 A full list of iPhone + Ipad applications is available at https://itunes.apple.com/id/artist/yufid-
inc./id369656348 accessed 26 October 2014. A list of Android applications is available at 
https://play.google.com/store/apps/developer?id=Yufid+Inc, accessed 26 October 2014. 
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images to increase a particular effect), the content of these documentaries revolves around a 
narrative that aims to urge viewers to ‘revive’ the purity of Islam in order to solve very real 
social and political problems. For example, in one recent post titled Bantu Anak Suriah Agar 
Tetap Sekolah (Assistance to keep Syrian Children in School), activists of Yufid and the 
YPIA’s ‘Peduli Muslim’ (Muslim Care) record themselves giving assistance to children 
during visits in 2013 and 2014 to Idlib, Syria. As the video implies, if the suffering of Syrian 
Sunni’s is to truly end there is a need for Muslim solidarity between Indonesian and Syrian 
Sunni Muslims through such assistance.   
According to Yufid’s founders, when they design an application they do not follow any pre-
conceived organisational strategy or plan, but rely on the resources available at a given time 
and the input of employees who constantly monitor wider debates within society. As one 
informant put it, ‘we are not an organisation but suddenly can move ourselves to a certain 
flow…this is called a community’ (Interview, Yogyakarta, 4 June 2012). Importantly, except 
for one of its co-founders, none of Yufid’s employees are religious scholars themselves, and 
so they continue to rely on a network of preachers and tutors from the YPIA and the at-Turots 
network in order to supply religious content. Nonetheless, the IT expertise of Yufid’s 
employees allows the group to adapt to an increased demand for online applications. This 
alters the form of da’wa in several significant ways - not least because they now aim to target 
a potentially global audience. Yufid’s employees utilise Google Analytics (as 65% of their 
traffic comes from Google searches) and iTunes Store in order to monitor downloads and 
customer feedback, so as to adapt to demands and suggestions. As they have noticed 
numerous downloads from people residing in Saudi Arabia, France, the UK, Germany and the 
US who request applications in English, they have, for example, created a number of new 
English language websites. 
Yufid does not represent a ‘de-territorialised’ or fully global form of da’wa however. They 
may form part of what Bunt has more generally labelled the ‘Cyber Islamic Environment’ 
driven by individuals that proselytise Islamic norms and seek online resources (Bunt, 2009); 
yet the significance of Yufid’s mission remains entangled in very local understandings of 
religious activism linked to campus lectures and socio-political forces. The internet provides a 
collaborative, fluid and transformative field through which one can promote and access 
Islamic knowledge, but also remains dependent on social, economic and infrastructural 
factors. One’s professional capabilities (an ability to design websites or read content in a 
specific language), one’s social position (ability to own or access a computer, or even 
consider this as an important part of one’s daily life), as well as geographical location (as 
urban environments are more densely saturated with Internet technology) are all important 
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structural factors that influence one’s access to the Internet. In this sense Yufid’s primary 
target is the tech savvy student audience they are familiar with. Further, while they believe 
that the Internet provides a platform through which activists can enhance their religious 
knowledge, it is not meant to replace the importance of physical lectures. Yufid’s founders 
stress that the internet should complement and not replace physical forms of Islamic learning 
within the mosque (Interview, Yogyakarta, 4 June 2012).  
Online ventures are instead characteristic of the broader substantive transformation of 
religious da’wa that seeks to align it with professional economic pursuits. Indeed, the 
founders of Yufid are also members of the Yayasan Bina Pengusaha Muslim (Muslim 
Businessmen Foundation, YBPM), a foundation formed in 2008 from a Yahoo chat group and 
whose explicit mission is to promote ideas of Islamic business in Indonesia. The YBPM runs 
an online Islamic ‘shopping mall’, organises business orientated religious counselling, and 
publishes the Pengusaha Muslim (Muslim Businessman) magazine, which is available on 
iTunes Newsstand. The aim of these products is to reach both Salafis within their network and 
also those who ‘have yet to know about the method of the Salaf al-Salih’, so as to increase the 
economic viability of Islamic business in Indonesia more holistically (Interview, Yogyakarta, 
4 June 2012). The emphasis is not explicitly on to the promotion of a Salafi doctrine, but 
relates to a broader concern that piety, economic aspiration and religious consumption can 
necessarily come together to bring worldly successes for both an individual and society.  
The perceived success of Yufid and the YBPM is linked to the creation of what Bonnefoy has 
termed ‘moral entrepreneurs’ (Bonnefoy, 2011), which refers to those who encourage their 
specific religious ideals through the idea of Muslim business in the modern capitalist 
market.16 They tap into processes of religious commodification that have become ever more 
popular amongst urban Indonesian Muslims (Fealy, 2008; Hasan, 2009, 2011; Jones, 2007; 
Lukens-Bull, 2008; Muzakki, 2008). Indeed, Salafis are adept at promoting their religious 
principles through an array of commodities such as t-shirts, bags, stickers and badges, which 
mix popular imagery and religious quotations (which are often advertised on Yufid websites 
or within Pengusaha Muslim). YPIA affiliated students have thus been at the forefront of 
creating their own religious products such as distro clothing. Briefly stated, distro, as a 
concept, is the sale of cheaply made t-shirts and fashion that frequently rearranges the logos 
of multinational companies to include catchy phrases or humorous alterations. It originated 
from the underground punk music scene in Bandung in 1993 and provided a form of self-
promotion through collectively owned outlets that doubled as forums through which music 
and political issues could be discussed (Uttu, 2006). By 2003 distro exploded into the 
                                                      
16 Bonnefoy is not alone in noting the confluence of business ethics and Islamic faith in Indonesia. 
Indeed, this topic has been covered more extensively by Rudnyckyj (2009a; 2009b). 
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mainstream as student designers – often from more well-off backgrounds and benefiting from 
better technology than their punk forerunners – were able to replicate and reconstruct global 
labels.  
By 2006 there were over 200 distro brands in Bandung alone and the trend had spread to 
other urban centres such as Yogyakarta (Uttu, 2006), where Islamic campus activists have 
tapped into their popularity to produce a range of products that alter popular brand logos (or 
sports team insignia) to underline their religious affiliations. Amongst Salafi activists, these 
are sold predominantly online, via www.muslim.or.id or Yufid’s online shop, but they aim to 
capture the youth market by mixing popular iconography and Islamic catchphrases. For 
instance, students within the YPIA have formed the Kaos Oblong label and sell t-shirts with 
tag lines such as Jenggot Yes, Isbal No! (Beard Yes, Long Trousers No!). Kaos Oblong also 
produce t-shirts promoting the Muslim.or.id website via a graphic logo stating ‘visit 
Muslim.or.id’ in a similar design and fashion as the Indonesian government’s tourist 
campaign of ‘Visit Indonesia.’ Such distro is not solely an attractive way of promoting one’s 
religion though, as it provides a means of income for students to subsidise their studies. Yet, 
they nevertheless alter the image of Salafism within the university campus. The wearer – as a 
young pious university student involved in da’wa and religious business – represents a 
modern, educated and innovative Muslim, cutting a specific image that combines Salafi dress 
and student ideals of fashion. Compared to Salafis living in rural communities or religious 
schools, they replace the jalabiyaa (long robes) or Islamic prayer shirts with t-shirts and 
stickers with catchy logos – although, like other Salafis, they do grow their beard and wear 
trousers that avoid isbal (trousers below the ankle). This represents more than an aesthetic 
difference though, underlining a broader reframing as to the meaning of faith and ‘living 
Islam’ within society, and it is to this deeper evolution I now wish to turn.    
A Modern Muslim Identity 
I now wish to further elaborate on the broader implications of what campus lectures, social 
media and Islamic business mean to our understanding of contemporary Salafi activism. As 
described above, on a methodological plane it underlines a dexterity amongst activists to align 
and promote their faith through practical mediums that appeal to young urban Muslims. Yet, 
substantively, it also denotes a fundamental shift in Salafi doctrine. Those examined in this 
paper enact what Bayat terms an ‘active piety’ to promote religious doctrine (Bayat, 2007: 
150), and in doing so they have brought topical issues that arise within the Indonesian 
university campus front and centre to how Salafism is understood. By bridging between one’s 
search for piety and the anxieties of living a modern ethical and successful lifestyle, activists 
have changed the very orientation of the movement. In social movement literature this 
transformation is understood through the concept of frame alignment, where agents can 
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bridge, amplify and transform a movement’s message in order to achieve resonance amongst 
constituents (Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986).  However, framing is not only 
symbolic but can affect the very orientation of a movement (Zald, 1996). Although Salafis 
rely on the Islamic works of scholars in Saudi Arabia, the everyday experiences of members 
themselves shift and alter the movement’s dynamics to give it a unique and local flavour.  
The above analysis has elaborated on several instances where activists reflect on everyday 
examples of student protests to provide an emotive appeal for correct religious faith that 
simultaneously intersects with a deeper ideological understanding of action, progress and 
identity. Informants have come to frame their piety in ways sensitive to student aspirations 
through a variety of techniques that transform how activists discuss and enact specific 
religious values. Most vividly, they do so by frequently juxtaposing their own religion and 
social standing against the ‘regressive’ and ‘village’ mentality of what they called Kampung 
Islam (Village Islam), a phrase used to reflect generally on rural Javanese society. Believing 
themselves to be educated progressive ‘forward’ looking Muslims, campus activists referred 
to the kampung as a source of economic and Islamic ‘backwardness’. They are rural spaces 
tainted by unIslamic Javanese traditions such as the Joyoboyo (Javanese zodiac) and ziarah 
(grave visits) that were followed out of blind faith (HASMI, 2011).17 In contrast, Salafi 
activists cultivate a sense of Muslimhood that explicitly rejects this idea of village mentality 
while simultaneously understanding themselves as a majlis or vanguard in the creation of a 
progressive Islamic future.  
References to the kampung represent a convergence between Salafi doctrine and broader 
national discourses of development, which provide reference points with which the 
Indonesian university audience can feel familiar. While I have shied away from providing a 
definitive typology of who joins the Salafi movement, it is notable that the majority of 
informants came from moderate (but not poor) rural or pseudo-rural (living approximately 10 
miles from a major city) areas and were of the first generation of their family to attend 
university. When discussing their enthusiasm for Salafism, several would compare its 
apparent clarity to the superstition and unquestioning loyalty to a Kyai (Islamic scholar, often 
linked to traditional Islamic practices such as those affiliated with Nahdlatul Ulama) that 
defined the Islam they knew at home. As one informant remarked, ‘One issue that made me 
interested (in Salafism) was because of its knowledge…no figure was considered the 
ideologue. This was different than the condition in my family where the Kyai is the ideologue’ 
                                                      
17 I am not the first to denote the derision of the kampung amongst Islamically inspired students; 
Brenner observed such a dichotomy in her study of Muslim women university students, who rejected 
the ‘Western’ elitist culture of the political classes but also the backwardness of one’s parent’s 
generation (Brenner, 1996).  
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(Interview, Yogyakarta, 4 June 2016). In comparison, Salafism stressed a modern 
egalitarianism, where preachers were respected but approachable, and knowledge could be 
obtained by all through study and perseverance.  
Within the national discourses of development, the kampung represents a bastion of timeless 
Indonesian culture, and a space from which students believed they had to distance themselves 
in order to become part of modern society. This was especially true during the Suharto New 
Order, where the kampung was used to legitimise political and economic policies as well as 
class distinctions, becoming what Bourchier has referred to as a form of ‘conservative 
indigenism’ (Bourchier, 1998). Indonesian culture, through the kampung, was promoted as 
being communalistic, harmonious and so reinforced Javanese aristocratic notions of statecraft. 
Indeed, as Sullivan noted, the kampung evoked an image of the Javanese village and its 
apparent loyalty to the royal court was an often-utilised image and a source of political 
legitimacy during the New Order (Sullivan, 1992).  
Differentiations between the kampung and the campus permeate da’wa amongst the YPIA 
and their Salafi associates. While I have previously focused exclusively on the YPIA’s 
campus activism in this paper, it is notable that many of their activists are also involved in 
rural based religious activities and welfare programs. They provide basic religious classes to 
children living in villages on the outskirts of Yogyakarta, and the YPIA also runs an ‘Islamic 
Centre Merapi’ – a relief centre that was formed in the aftermath of the 2010 Merapi volcanic 
eruption and has since gone on to offer basic education to surrounding rural communities. 
However, such activism varies greatly when compared to campus learning. In rural 
communities, da’wa includes handing out a number of A6 size buku saku (pocket books) that 
provide summaries of major religious works. These pocket books offer simple descriptions of 
religious practices, such as salat (prayer), wudu (ritual washing before prayer), and proper 
dress through bullet points and explanatory diagrams. For example, the buku saku version of 
Sifat Shalat Nabi (Ways of Prayer According to the Prophet) by Shaykh Mohammad Nasir al-
Din al-Albani is a mere 50 pages while the ‘full’ edition that students at the YPIA are 
required to read is over 250 pages.18    
Rural lectures also differ when compared to campus lectures. I observed one such lecture at 
the Masjid al-Ikhlasan (al-Ikhlasan mosque), located in Sawangan village, an hour and a half 
away from Yogyakarta, from March to July 2012. The mosque was constructed in 2009 by 
local Salafi enthusiasts and built in an architectural style more akin to the Middle East than 
rural Java. Every Sunday they would hold an open lecture, which attracted approximately 100 
male participants who came dressed not in Salafi-esque clothing but a mixture of sarongs and 
                                                      
18 I am specifically referring to the translation published by Media Hidayah (Al-Albani, 2000). 
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songkok (a black traditional hat). The residing preacher, who was a teacher at the Salafi 
Pesantren al-Irsyad in nearby Salatiga, was light-hearted, mild and polite. While critical of 
contemporary society he delved little into world politics, preferring to look at welfare, 
behaviour and social justice. For example, in a lecture given just before Ramadan he asked 
the audience to ‘moralise’ their religious practice (mengikhlaskan ibada) so as to assist in 
building an ethical society (Observation, Sawangan, 15 July 2012). Sensitive to the 
composition of his audience, he also occasionally switched from Indonesian to Javanese, most 
notably when he wished to find a catchphrase that could summarise a particular issue he was 
reflecting upon. He forwent any dialogical exchange with the audience to focus on the need to 
correct ibada (Islamic practice) and muamala (social relations). The nuances of this message 
differed from the urban lecture as, rather than pushing the audience to think of themselves as 
a ‘saved’ group, the stress was on good morality and touched little on national socio-political 
issues. When he did touch on society, his repertoire was different from that seen on the 
campus, as he talked about the problem of crime and alcohol abuse amongst the village youth, 
rather than promoting the need for an Islamic modern society. Furthermore, these sessions – 
unlike lectures within the campus – did not include any question and answer session, 
allegedly because of fears this could lead to an audience member hijacking the event to 
promote a ‘political’ agenda.19  
Urban Salafi activists, in comparison, see themselves as part of a growing progressive and 
professional milieu that combines their piety with a broader desire to be modern members of 
an educated class. They are, in this regards, part of a more fundamental shift that has occurred 
amongst Muslim professionals within Indonesia. The influx of consumer goods and greater 
level of social mobility amongst university educated Muslims has come to inform and 
facilitate the very concepts upon which an outward religious identity transects with ideas of 
modern belonging. Salafis tailor their consumption patterns and da’wa, selecting preachers 
and the magazines or websites they access so as to socially demarcate themselves as members 
of a particular segment of the Salafi movement, which is educated and modern. As both 
Hasan and Muzakki have argued, Islam in Indonesia has become a symbolic commodity that 
is selected by followers in order to reify their own identity within a social group (Hasan, 
2009, 2011; Muzakki, 2008). The very process of picking and consuming goods becomes 
                                                      
19 Moreover, the lack of questions, I believe, was linked to a general uncertainty as to how an Ustadz 
would be received in such an environment. Questions necessarily open the door for representatives of 
‘local’ Islamic practice to critique them. At one further event I attended in Yogyakarta, a local Kyai, 
while respectful and in general agreement with Salafi principles, created a degree of confusion and 
embarrassment by using several Javanese phrases that the Ustadz could not understand. It caused a 
level of furore amongst the audience and underlines the challenges experienced by preachers in gaining 
local credibility and the risk they run in encountering hostility (Observation, Yogyakarta, 15 February 
2012).  
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representational of how one defines both one’s ‘religious’ identity and one’s social and 
economic class (Fealy, 2008).20 Campus based Salafi activists thus demarcate themselves 
from rural segments of the movement and Muslim population, and the use of religious 
commodities and explicit reference to the kampung sets them apart from other Salafi Muslims 
in this regards.  
Importantly, this is not unique to religion as both Schulte-Nordholt and Dick have pointed out 
that the consumption of specific goods and products has, historically speaking, acted as a 
crucial marker through which middle classes in Indonesia have come to identify themselves 
as such (H. W. Dick, 1985; H.W. Dick, 1990; Schulte-Nordholt, 2011). Yet, it nevertheless 
represents a fundamental and qualitative shift in Indonesian Islamic expression, and a 
significant development within the Salafi movement specifically. Salafi campus activists may 
draw from the same scriptural references as their rural Salafi counterparts, but the ability to 
utilise social media and create religious commodities has led them in a vastly different 
direction, envisioning their movement as something that is not just engaged with society, but 
also part of a broader professional Muslim society. They thus represent a re-articulation of 
Salafi doctrine, aiming to return to an ‘original’ Islam that both saves oneself and provides a 
solution to the social and economic ills of contemporary society.   
Conclusion 
The development of new forms of Salafi activism amongst students and graduates underlines 
the diverse ways Salafism has developed since its inception in Indonesia over 30 years ago. 
While this paper is limited to a number of specific student based foundations and industries 
such as the YPIA and Yufid - and so is in no way representative of the broader Salafi 
movement in its totality - it provides a case study as to how urban Salafi activists have 
become adept at transforming both the substance and form of their religious propagation in 
contemporary Indonesia. In line with broader trends of Islamic revival across the archipelago, 
Salafis are busy constructing radio stations, online social media services, and commodities 
that promote an Islamic identity. However, such activism signifies both personal faith and 
membership to a social class. The vocabulary of development and modernity is apparent here, 
denoting the differences between the kampung and the educated and urban environments in 
which such activism is based. This does not imply that rural communities are secondary to 
Salafi activism; indeed, other studies of Salafism make it clear that rural Java remains one of 
the most active areas for Salafi foundations. Yet, for urban and campus activists, Salafi 
                                                      
20 Class means more than correlation between a group’s income, but refers to a particular consciousness 
that explains the differences between different social behaviours over matters of ‘the common good’ 
(of one’s class) (Klinken & Berenschot, 2014).  
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values, which remain sensitive to concerns within a given locality, have been reframed as a 
solution to the challenges of modern life.  
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